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A B S T R A C T
This paper considers a dynamic investment model of a monopolistic firm,
facing adjustment costs that are concave-convex in the rate of investment.
Assuming that the firm is managed by the shareholders, the objective is to
maximize the discounted stream of dividends over a finite plannning hori-
zon, plus the terminal value of the capital stock. The problem of finding
an optimal investment path is solved by combining results from a model with
concave adjustment costs with results from a model with convex adjustment
costs. The results are presented in phase diagrams and are economically
interpreted.
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11. INTRODUCTION
This paper develops optimal investment rules in a dynamic model of a
monopolistic firm, facing a U-shaped average cost of capital stock
adjustment. Consequently, the total adjustment cost becomes a concave-
convex function of the investment rate. Our results are derived by using
optimal control theory for systems in continuous time, with a fixed and
finite planning horizon.
The influence of adjustment costs on the firm's optimal behavior has
been noted by, for instance, Gould (1968), Rothschild (1971), Nickell
(1978), Davidson and Harris (1981). For a survey, see Stlderstrtlm (1976).
However, there does not seem to be general agreement on what should be the
"proper" shape of the adjustment cost function. Models with convex
adjustment cost functions (i.e. increasing marginal costs of adjusting the
capital stock) have been studied by e.g. Gould (1968), Nickell (1978). The
use of such cost functions can be realistic, for example, in a situation
where a firm, operating in a monopsonistic environment, wishes to acquire
capital. Then the firm must face increasing prices because of the increased
demand for capital goods. On the other hand, concave adjustment cost
functions (implying decreasing marginal costs) have also been proposed; see
Rothschild (1971), Nickell (1978). Such cost functions could emerge when
fixed ordering costs and quantity discounts are present, but also because
of indivisibilities, economies of information in training and so forth (cf.
Rothschild (1971, pp. 608-609)).
Davidson and Harris (1981) argue that the adjustment cost function be
concave-convex. In a continuous-time model there could be some initial
economies to scale when adjusting the capital stock, but as the investment
rate becomes larger, in a firm of a given size, average adjustment costs
2eventually increase. Put in another way: installing capital at a(too) high
rate ultimately leads to increasing costs. Nickell (1978) notes that
strictly convex adjustment costs imply that it is more expensive to do
adjustments quickly than slowly. If we consider internal adjustment costs
(which are costs related to the adjustment of capital stocks andlor labor
force within the firm) this may be true for sufficiently large amounts of
investment expenditure. But internal adjustment costs being convex for low
investment rates (for example, installing a new production line over a
period of fifty years) make little or no sense. Therefore, when
monopsonistic elements in the capital gooda market are not predominant it
may be better to suppose that adjustment costs are concave for small rates
of ínvestment. (Note that the presence of a monopsonistic market structure
always lead to a stricly canvex adjustment cost function).
The dynamic investment model to be studied in this paper is a
modification of the one proposed by van Loon (1983) (see also Kort (1989))
and the reader is referred to these works for further details. The
organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the dynamic
optimization problem of the firm and Section 3 contains the mathematical
analysis of the optimal control problem as well as economic interpretations
of the results. Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. A DYNAI~IIC INVESTMENT MODEL
Consider a monopolistic firm behaving so as to maximize the shareholders'
value of the firm, consisting of the discounted stream of dividends over
the planning period plus the discounted value of the amount of equity at
3the end of the planning period. Hence the firm seeks to maximize the
objective functional
T
f exp(-rt)D(t)dt t exp(-rT)X(T)
0
(1)
where D- D(t) is the rate of dividend payout at time t, X- X(t) the stock
of equity by time t, r~ constant ~ 0 the shareholders' time preference
rate, and T the finite length of the firm's fixed planning period.
Suppose that depreciation is proportional to the capital stock and let I-
I(t) be the rate of gross investment at time t, K- K(t) the stock of
capital by time t and a- constant ~ 0 the depreciation rate. The equation
for the evolution of the stock of capital becomes
K- I- aK, K(0) - Ko - constant ~ 0. (Z)
Furthermore, suppose that the firm's only asset is its stock of capital
goods which, in turn, can only be financed by equity. After fixing the unit
value of the capital stock at one unit of money, it holds that K- X in the
firm's balance sheet.
Let the gross earnings of the firm be given by a function S- S(K),
such that S(K) ~ 0 for K ~ 0, S'(K) ~ 0, S"(K) ~ 0, S(0) - 0. Let A a A(I)
denote the rate of adjustment cost incurred when investing at rate I and
assume that A(I) satisfies the following conditions: A(0) a 0, A'(I) ~ 0
for I ~ 0, and A"(I) ~ 0 for I ~ Io , A"(I) ~ 0 for I ~ Io .
Earnings, after deduction of depreciation and adjustment costs, can be
used to pay out dividends and~or increase retained earnings (i.e., equity).
Hence
X- S(K) - aK - A(I) - D. (3)
Using (2) and (3), and noticing that X- K, yields
4D - S(K) - I - A(I) (4)
and substitution of (4) into (1) gives the final form of the objective
functional
T
J exp(-rt)(S(K) - I- A(I))dt t exp(-rT)K(T).
0
Introducing lower bounds on dividends as well as investment yields the
(la)
mixed state-control constraint
D- S(K) - I- A(I) ? 0 (5)
and the pure control constraint
I ~ 0. (6)
Inequality (5) states that total (investment) costs must not exceed total
current revenue whereas inequality (6) states that investment is
irreversible and thus bounded below by zero.
The following assumption is made for technical reasons.
S(K) - aK - A(aK) ~ 0 (7)
and has the interpretation that profits (after depreciation and adjustment
costs) are strictly positive for every admissible K, when investment is
just at the replacement level. It is possible to introduce (7) explicitly
as a pure state constraint (replacing strict inequality by weak
inequality). However, wishing to avoid this we have assumed that such a
5constraint never becomes binding. (This is likely to be the case if the
depreciation rate, a, is relatively small).
The optimal control problem of the firm has now been formulated:
determine an investment path, I(t), over a fixed and finite planning period
[O,TJ, such that the objective functional in (la) is maximal, subject to
the constraints (2), (5), and (6).
Models related to this control problem can be found in Appelbaum and
Harris (1978), Skiba (1978), Davidson and Harris (1981), Hartl and Mehlmann
(1983) and Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, Ch. 13). However, all these
analyses deal with the case of an infinite planning period where, from
obvious reasons, there is no salvage value term in the objective function.
In the model at hand, the planning period is finite and we include a
salvage value term being the terminal value of the capital stock. The set-
up in Davidson and Harris (1981) is close to ours but these authors do not
introduce an upper bound on the investment rate. Hence, the paper at hand
changes the Davidson and Harris model to deal with a finite planning
horizon and specifies an endogenous upper bound on investment given by
S(K) ~ I t A(I). An upper bound on investment was considered in Appelbaum
and Harris (1978) who, however, disregarded the adjustment costs. Thus the
upper bound on investment in Appelbaum and Harris was given by S(K) ~ I.
3. ANALYSIS OF THE INVESTMENT PEOBLEM
Define the total cost function, C(I), as C(I) - I t A(I) and notice that
C(0) z A(0) - 0, C' s 1 t A' ~ 0, C" a A" and C~I - 1 t AII. This implies
that C' and A' attain their minimum at I a Io whereas C~I and AII attain
their minimum at I- I1 ; see also Figure 1.
6[Insert Figure 1 about here]
The current-value Hamiltonian is given by H(I,K,p) - S(K) - paK f pI -
C(I) and p ia a(current-value) adjoint variable. Using the maximum
princigle, we should maximize the Hamiltonian with respect to I for any
arbitrary but fixed pair (K,p). To determine the eign of p we need the
adjoint equation
p-(r t s)p - S'(K) such that p(T) a 1. (8)
Integration in (8) shows that the adjoint variable is stricly positive for
all t e[O,T]. Recall that p has the usual interpretation as a shadow
price (of a unit) of capital atock at date t.
Disregarding for a moment the upper bound on C(I) (i.e., C(I) s S(K)),
an investment policy which maximizes the Hamiltonian is characterized by
I(P)
~ -
I - 0 or II if p C p
where p is defined by
C'(I1) - C(I1)JI1 ~ p. (9)
Notice that I(p) ~ I1 and I(p) is a solution of C'(Z) - p, that is, I(p) -
(C')-1(P).
To take the constraint C(I) s S(K) into account we must modify the
investment policy as follows. There are two cases to consider.
Case 1: II s C-1(S(K)).
Here, an optimal investment policy is characterized by
0
7min{I(p), C-1(S(K))}





Case 2: I1 ~ C-1(S(K)).
Here, an optimal investment policy is characterized by
C-1(S(K))





The derivation of the optimal policies in Cases 1 and 2 is straightforward
and omitted.
Note that the transversality condition in (8) implies that there is
always a terminal interval on which the optimal investment rate is zero. On
such an interval there is not enough time left to defray the adjustment
costs of new investments. Hence, such investments should not be undertaken
(cf. also Kort (1989)).
What we have obtained until now is a preliminary characterization of
an optimal investment policy. The further analysis will proceed as
follows. First we analyze a model with a globally concave adjustment cost
function. Second, a model with a globally convex adjustment cost function
is studied and, third, we combine the results of these two analyses so as
to construct a solution to the problem with a concave-convex adjuatment
cost function. These derivations are made in Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3,
respectively.
L3.1 Concave Adiustment Cost Function
A similar model was studied by Kort (1989) but only for the case of a fixed
upper bound on the investment rate. (Recall that in the present paper
C-1(S(K)) provides an upper bound on the investment rate). Let C(I) be a
strictly concave (total) inveatment cost function. Following the standard
procedure ( see, e.g., Feichtinger and Hartl (1986)) we replace function
C(I) by a function, say, C1{I,K), being linear in I and such that
C1(I,K) ~ I S(K)IC-1(S(K)) : s I B(K). (12)
For any fixed K the function C1(I,K) coincides with C(I) at I a 0 and at
I- C-1(S(K)) but C1(I,K) is below C(I) for 0 ~ I ~ C-1(S(K)).
We proceed with solving the linearized problem. The objective
functional for this problem becomes
T
f exp(-rt)[S(K) - I g(K)Jdt t exp(-rT)K(T)
0
and substituting I- K t aK into (lb) yields
T .




Define the auxiliary functions M(K) :a S(K) - g(K)aK and N(K) :- g(K)
(which are C1 functions) and note that a singular solution, say, Kw, of the
linear problem satisfies (Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, Section 3.3))
rN(Kw) t M'(K~) - 0, that is,
- rg(K) f S'(K) - ag(K) - aKg'(K) - 0 (13)
9where
g'(K) ~ d(S(K)~C-1(S(K)))~dK -
(14)
S'(K)~C-1(S(K)) - S'(K)S(K)IC'(5(K))(C-I(S(K)))2.
Define the set Q(K) -{I-aK~ 0 5 I 5 C-1(S(K))} ~[-aK, C-1(S(K})-aKJ
and notice that zero is an element in Q because of (7). This implies that
the singular solution is sustainable. Inserting (14) into (13) yields
S'(K) - (atr)S(K)~C-1(S(K)) - aK S'(K)jC-1(S(K)) t
(14s)
aK S'(K)S(K)~C'(S(K))(C-1(S(K)))Z - 0.
It is well known that if no feasible solution(s) exists to (14a) and,
in such a case, the left-hand side of (14a) is negative (positive) for all
admissible K, then it is optimal to invest so as to approach K- 0(K -~)
as fast as possible, starting from Ko. (Notice that such an investment
policy need not exist).
If (14a) has a unique solution, say, K~ (such that 0 e Q(K~), K~ ~ 0),
and the left-hand side of (14a) is positive for K ~ K~, negative for K~
K~, it is optimal to invest so as to approach K~ as fast as possible,
starting from Ko. Note that 0 e Q(K~) holds but the solution of (14a) is
not necessarily unique.
In order to secure existence and uniqueness of such a solution to (14a)
we impose the following assumptions. Suppose that (i) the derivative
d(rN(K) t M'(K))~dK is negative for all K ~ 0 and that (ii) the value rN(0)
t M'(0) is positive. Then there exists a K~ ~ 0 being a unique solution to
10(14a). In the appendix we present a set of sufficient conditions which will
guarantee that hypotheses (i) and (ii) are satisfied.
The optimal investment policy for the linearized problem is given by
if
0 5 K ~ K~ (15a)
K - K~ (15b)
K ~ K~ (15c)
To exclude a pure bang-bang policy we assume that the plannning period, T,
is sufficiently long such that the unique optimal solution I~ (given by
(15)) can reach the steady state value aK~ at some instant t ~ T.
Recall (cf. (12) and (la),(lb)) the relationship between the problem with
concave cost function C(I) and the linearized problem with cost function
C1(I,K) and notice that both problems have the same set of admissible
solutions. For any admissible policy I(t) it holds that
T
0 c J: f exp(-rt)(S(K) - C(I))dt t exp(-rT)K(T) s
0
T
f exp(-rt)(S(K) - C1(I,K))dt t exp(-rT)K(T) 5 (16)
0
T
f exp(-rt)(S(K) - C1(I~,K))dt f exp(-rt)K(T) :- J1
0
where the first inequality follows from the constraint C(I) s S(K) and the
second one from the definition of function C1(I,K). The third inequality
follows from the optimality of I~ as defined in (15). Hence, the optimal
value of the objective functional of the linearized problem, J1, provides an
upper bound on the value of the objective functional of the concave
problem, J.
11If the linearized problem does not admit a singular solution, the
solutions of the concave problem and the linear problem are the same. (This
is intuitively clear but see also, for example, Feichtinger and Hartl
(1986, Th. 3.3)). When the linearized problem does have a singular
solution, it can be seen from (16) that no solution of the concave problem
will give a value of J which actually reaches the upper bound J1. However,
it can be shown (Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, Section 3.5)) that J1 can be
approximated arbitrarily close by using a chattering control. Such a
control consists of switching the investment rate, in principle infinitely
fast, between the bounds I- 0 and I- C-1(S(K)), in order to keep K(t) as
close as possible to K~ on the time interval where K~ (the singular
solution) is optimal. A solution contaíning a phase of chattering control
will be denoted as E-optimal (Davidson and Harris (1981)).
The E-optimal solution of the concave adjustment cost problem is
depicted in Figure 2 for the case of a small initial stock of capital (Ko ~
K~); the chattering control is represented by a dot.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
The results obtained for a concave adjustment cost function can be
summarized as follows. For the case of a small initial stock of capital, Ko
~ K~ (K~ given by (14a)), an e-optimal investment policy consists of an
initial phase of maximal investment, I- C-1(S(K)), followed by an
intermediate interval of chattering between I- 0 and I- C-1(S(K)). This
interval is the one where K~ is optimal in the linearized problem. The
purpose of the chattering control is to keep K as close as possible to K~.
On a terminal interval investment is zero (due to the transversality
condition). Some economic interpretations will be offered later, in
12connection with the construction of the full solution of the concave-convex
problem.
3.2 Convex Adiustment Cost Function
This situation has been studied extenaively in the literature and we only
give a brief account of the main results. In this section, let C(I) be a
strictly convex (total) cost function.
In the convex case it is easily shown that an optimal policy has
the same structure as (15) (cf. Kort (1989, Section 3.3) but K~ is no
longer constant. The optimal investment policy is characterized by
I ~ C-1(S(K)) (Path 1)
I - I(p) (Path 2)
I ~ 0 (Path 3).
Recall that I(p) -(C')-1(p). I(p) is also determined through the relation
I - [(rta)C'(I) - S'(K)]IC"(I). (17)
An analysis of the synthesis problem yields the following trajectories as
candidates for optimality, depending on the specific set of model
parameters.
I. Path 1-y Path 2-. Path 3
II. Path 2 y Path 3
III. Path 3-y Path 2 y Path 3
IV. Path 3.
13The investment policy I(p) on Path 2 is non-increasing over time when it is




Trajectory II occurs if NPVMI e 0 at t- 0
~
III, IV
where NPVMI means "net present value of marginal investment" The
expressions for NPVMI on the various paths can be found in Equations
(3.20-22) in Kort (1989).
An equilibrium point (K,I) must satisfy K a I a 0. Equations (2) and
(17) show that such a point is characterized by
S'(K) - (rta)C'(aK) (18)
and it is a saddle point in the K-I plane.
In Figure 3 the optimal solution is depicted for a case where NPVMI ~
0 at ta0. In such a case it is optimal to start with maximal investment at
the rate I~ C-1(S(K)), followed by the interior policy I(p) (where
investment is non-increasing over time). The final phase of zero investment
also occurs here.
[Inaert Figure 3 about here]
Notice that the equilibrium point, K, may never be reached (for a detailed
discussion; see Kort (1989, pp. 149-50). This fact is due to the presence of
the flexible accelerator mechanism which shows up in problems with convex
adjustment costs; see also Gould (1968).
143.3 Concave-convex Adiustment Cost Function
In this section we combine the solution of the problem having a concave
adjustment cost function with the solution of the problem having a convex
adjustment cost function. This will yield a complete solution of the
problem posed in Section 2.
Consider the K-I plane and notice that the phase diagram (Figure 3) for
the convex case is valid when I~ I1. For I ~ I1 the results for the
concave case (Figure 2) can be used, with a slight modification (to which we
shall return). Assumption (7) yields aK ~ C-1(S(K)) and, depending on the
functional forms of S(K) and C(I) (and the parameters), one of the
following inequalities must always be true.
Case (i): I1 ~ I ~ C-1(S(K))
Case (ii): I ~ I1 ~ C-1(S(K))
Case (iii): I ~ C-1(S(K)) ~ I1.
Here, I- aK and K is given by (18). The solution (depicted by a solid
curve) in each of the three cases ( i), (ii) and ( iii), respectively, is
graphed in Figures 4, S and 6. If we assume that Ko ia sufficiently small,
an optimal investment policy always contains an initial phase of maximal
investment. Furthermore, there is always a terminal phase of zero
?nvestment. That is, I- C-1(S(K)) on an initiel interval, say, [O,tl] and
I~ Q on a final interval, say, [t2,T].
REMARK
In what follows we shall use the generic symbols tI, t2, and t3 to indicate
instants where the investment policy awitches from one type to another.
In order not to complicate the notation unnecessarily we have chosen to
15employ the symbols tl, t2, and t3 in all three cases (i)-(iii). However, it
is obvious that a particular switching instant will depend on the
characteristics of the case under consideration.
Now we proceed with characterizing the investment policy to be employed
in Cases (i)-(iii).
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
Case (i): Refer to Fiaure 4.
For I ~ I1 we use the results of Section 3.2 (where the model with s
convex adjustment cost function was analyzed). The solution depicted in
Figure 3 shows that, at some moment, say, tl, the initially optimal policy
of maximal investment, I~ C-1(S(K)), must be replaced by the (non-
increasing) policy I- I(p) -(C')-1(p). We shall need the following lemma.
Lemma 1. Let t2 be the instant at which I(p) becomes equal to I1 and let K
denote the corresponding value of K. For e~ 0 and sufficiently small it
holds that
I- I(p) ~ I1 for t2 - e ~ t 5 t2
I - 0 for t2 ~ t ~ t2 t E.
Proof. See the appendix.
The lemma implies that from the instant t2 and till the end of the planning
period, the investment rate is set equal to zero.
16To summarize, in Case ( i) an optimal investment policy is given by
C-1(S(K}) 0 ~ t ~ tl
I~ I(p) for tl 5 t s t2 (19)
~ t2 ~ t s T.
The economic implications of such a policy are as follows. Endowed with a
small initial amount of capital goods, Ko, the firm starts out by investing
at the maximal rate on the interval [O,tl). This is a growth phase where no
dividends are paid out since all revenues are used for investment (recall
that C(I) ~ S(K) during this phase). The investment rate and the stock of
capital are both increasing over tíme (due to assumption (7); see also Kort
(1989, p. 142)). At the instant tl this growth phase stops because of the
fact that marginal earnings have become too small to finance the rising
marginal investment costs. (Note that S'(K) decreases when K increases and
that C'(S(K)) increases when K increases and S(K) ~ I1; see also Figure 1).
At t- tl the firm switches from a maximal to an "interior"
investment policy, I~ I(p). The latter is characterized by C'(I) a p, that
is, marginal investment costs equal the shadow price of capital stock.
During the interval [tl,t2] the investment rate is continuously non-
increasing with respect to time. On this interval the capital stock first
increases but then starts to decrease as soon as the investment rate falls
below the replacement level. Since investment is not at its upper bound, a
positive amount of dividends is paid out.
The instant t2 is determined as the moment where the investment rate
becomes equal to I1. On the final interval (t2,Tj contraction occurs in the
sense that no investment is undertaken. All profits are distributed as
dividends and the stock of capital goods continues to decrease on that
interval.
17In Case (i) we have seen that the investment rate drops from I(p) - II
to zero just after t- t2. In the problem with a globally convex adjuetment
cost function (Figure 3) there is an interval, preceding the final phase of
zero investment, on which the investment rate is continuously decreasing
towards zero. If the policy of Case (i) included such an interval, on which
I is lower than II, then such investment rates would be unprofitable
because of the higher average costs (C~I) (see also Figure 1).
[Insert Figure S about here]
Case (ii): Refer to FiQUre 5.
We start by proving the following lemma which, as Lemma 1, characterizes
the investment policy on an intermediate time interval.
Lemma 2. Define a level of capital, say, K, by S'(K) -(atr)C'(I1) and let
t3 be an instant of time such that tl ~ t3 ~ t2. There exists an interval
[t1,t3J un which investment is given by I- I(p) and investment decreases
on this interval until I- I1, at which point it holds that K- K. The
instant of time when this happens is t3. On the interval [t3,t2] investment
chatters between 0 and I1 in order to keep K as close as possible to K.
Proof: See the appendix.
The implication of the lemma is as follows. As previously, on an initial
interval [O,t1J, investment is maximal, I- C-1(S(K)), and both capital
stock and investments are growing over time. Hence, on this interval
marginal earnings decrease whereas (for I ~ I1) marginal adjustment costs
18increase. At the instant tl the firm should start to let the investment
rate decrease. On the interval (tl,t3] investment is kept at its "interior"
level I a I(p), implying a continuously non-increasing inveatment rate (as
in Case (i)). But, in contrast to Case (i), the investment rate reaches at
time t- t3 the line I- I1 before falling below the replacement level.
Therefore, the capital stock increases on the whole interval [tl,t3].
At time t-t3 the capital stock reaches its equilibrium value K where it
holds that the marginal earnings rate equals the marginal cost rate. The
latter consists of the sum of the shareholders' time preference rate (r)
and the depreciation rate (s), corrected for the fact that adjustment costs
must be paid in order to increase the capital stock by one dollar.
Notice that one might argue that the firm should employ an investment
policy which maintains the capital stock at the level K. In the problem at
hand such a replacement policy would, however, be suboptimal since it would
induce a higher average investment cost (see Figure 1 and note that aK ~ I1).
The better policy is to keep K as close as possible to K by using a
chattering control, that is, the investment rate switches rapidly between 0
and I1. This is what happens on the interval (t3,t2). From the instant t2
and onwards investment is zero.




Chattering between 0 and I1
0
0 5 t ~ tl
tl 5 t 5 t3
t3 ~ t ~ t2
t2 5 t 5 T
Notice, in contrast to Case (i), that the policy I(p) is not extended all
over the intermediate interval (tl,tZ] but a period of chattering
investment on (t3,t2) precedes the final interval of zero investment.
19[Insert Figure 6 about here]
Case (iii): Refer to Fieure 6.
This case has been treated in some detail in Section 3.1 (cf. Figure 2). It
suffices to state the following characteristics of the investment policy.
On the initial interval (O,tl) it is optimal to invest maximally, that is,
I- C-1(S(K)), due to the high marginal earnings (Ko is relatively low and
hence S'(K) is high). This policy is followed by chattering such that I
switches as fast as possible between 0 and C-1(S(K)) on the interval
[tl,t2), in order to keep K as close as possible to the singular level K~
(cf. (14b)). As in Case (ii), a chattering policy is better than
replacement investment because the chattering policy carries a lower
adjuscment cost. On the final interval, [t2,t3], no investment is
undertaken.
An e-optimal investment policy is characterized by
C-1(S(K)) 0 s t t tl
Chattering between 0 and C-1(S(K)) tl 5 t ~ t2
0 t2 s t s T.
Notice that only in the convex adjustment cost model (Section 3.2) the
investment rate is continuous with respect to time throughout the interval
(O,T]. Of the three alternative solutions of the concave-convex adjustment
cost model we see that the solution in Case (i) is the one which comes
closest to having this property. Recall that the policy in Case (i) only
has one discontinuity (at t- t). 2
The solution in Case (iii) has the same structure as the solution of
the concave adjustment cost model, which is due to the relatively high
value of I1, below which the average cost function is decreasing. In Case
20(ii) the intermediate phase consists of a region where the investment rate
is continuous in time and a chattering control region. Hence, the influence
of the convex and the concave parts of the adjustment cost function is
perhaps most clearly reflected here. This is due to the fact that the
value of I1 is neither particularly high nor low.
4. CONCLUDING BFa4ABRS
In this paper a dynamic investment model of a firm has been analyzed. A key
feature was the assumption of a concave-convex investment adjustment cost
function. Depending on the parameter values and the specific functional
forms of the earnings and cost functions, three different types of optimal
solutions emerged. These solutions were illustrated in phase diagrams for
the case of a small initial stock of capital goods.
A common characteristic of all solutions was an initial maximal growth
phase and a terminal phase of zero investment. However, on an intermediate
interval the solutions were different. In the first case the investment
rate decreased continuously until reaching a value at which the average
adjustment costs are minimal. In the second case such a phase also appeared
but was followed by a chattering investment policy where the investment
rate switched rapidly between zero and the value at which average
adjustment costs are minimal. In the thizd case the intermediate interval
only contained the chattering policy where the investment rate switches
rapidly between zero and its upper bound.
The literature on optimal dynamic investment under adjustment costs has
mainly focused on the case of convex adjustment costs. However, as already
indicated in the introduction, some authors have argued that a partly
21concave adjustment cost function could also be economically plausible. In
particular, an adjustment cost function being concave for low investment
rates and convex for higher investment rates could also be realistic but
not much attention has been paid to investment policies subject to
adjustment costs of such a shape.
Davidson and Harris (1981) studied the implications of a concave-
convex adjustment cost function when the firm maximizes its discounted cash
flow over an infinite planning period and where there is no upper bound on
the rate of investment. In the paper at hand, the planning period is finite
and we impose an endogenous upper bound on the investment rate. This bound
arises from the requirement that dividends must remain non-negative.
In all cases we obtained an initial growth phase with maximal
investment and a final contraction phase (where investment is zero due to
the finite planning period). These phases did not appear in the work by
Davidson and Harris. Moreover, the policy to be followed during the
intermediate phase seems to have a richer structure compared to that in
Davidson and Harris. For instance, these authors obtain a final policy of
investment which chatters between zero and an unspecified value (being
greater than or equal to I1). (This policy is to be applied after having
reached the equilibrium value of K). Introduction of an upper bound on
investment made it possible for us to give a precise characterization of
the levels of investment to be employed in the chattering policies in Cases
(ii) and (iii). Finally notice that, due to their assumptions, Davidson and
Harris did not need to distinguish between the situations treated in our
Cases (ii) and (iii).
A major point of critique which can be raised against the optimal
investment policies of Section 3 is the occurrence of chattering controls.
A chattering investment policy, alternating between zero and "high" levels of
22investment, can be interpreted to imply in practice, the faster the
switching the better. Although this interpretation implies that a"pulsing"
policy with the highest possible pulsing frequency may be the most
profitable, the chattering itself is not an implementable policy in
practice (see, e.g., Feichtinger and Sorger (1986), Hahn and Hyun (1989)).
However, the investment "cycles" of continuous time models can be thought of
as counterparts of investment in "lumps", encountered in discrete time
investment models.
Avoiding the occurence of chattering policies requires a change of the
model set-up. A few remarks on this issue seem to be in order. Chattering
investment policies can be excluded from optimality if we incorporate a
sufficiently large "start-up" cost which is incurred every time the firm
raises the investment rate from zero to a positive level (Davidson and
Harris (1981, Section 4)). Incidentally, such a cost plays the same role as
"re-entry" costs in the theory of optimal extraction of resources (Lewis
and Schmalensee (1982)) or "pulsing costs" in models of optimal advertising
(Hahn and Hyun (1989)). From studies like these it is known that the
introduction of such costs prevents the occurence of chattering. (For
instance, Hahn and Hyun shows that periodic pulsing (rather than
chattering) is the better advertieing policy). Yet another possibility is
to introduce adjustment costs being convex in the rate of change of the
investment rate, that is, the adjustment cost function is modified to
depend on I as well as I and are concave-convex in I but convex in I.
APPENDIX
The purpose of the appendix is first to establish conditions for existence
and uniqueness of a solution to Eq.(14a) in Section 3.1. Without loss of
23generality we can assume a zero discount rate. Differentiation of function
rN(K) f M'(K) shows that
d(rN(K)tM'(K))~dK - S"(K){1-aK~C-1(S(K))} - 2aS'(K)~C-1(S(K)) t
{2aK[S'(K)]2 t 2aS(K)S'(K) f aKS(K)S"(K)}~C'(S(K))[C-1(S(K))]2 -
{aK[S'(K)J2S(K)C"(S(K)) f 2aK[S'(K)]2S(K))~[C'(S(K)]2[C-1(S(K)]2.
The first term on the right-hand side is negative by assumption (7). A
sufficient (but not necessary) condition for global negativity of the
derivative d(rNtM')~dK is as follows.
-2K[S'(K)J2C'(S(K)) - 2S(K)S'(K)C'(S(K)) - KS(K)S"(K)C'(S(K)) f
K[S'(K)]2S(K)C"(S(K)) t 2K(S'(K)]2S(K) ~ 0. (A.1)
Denote the left-hand side of inequality (A.1) by W(K). Hence W(K) ~ 0 is a
sufficient condition for global negativity of d(rNtM')~dK. Suppose that the
revenue function S(K) satisfies
2(S'(K)]2 ~ - S'(K)S(K)
(A.2)
which is guaranteed if S(K) does not grow "too fast". (For example, (A.2)
holds for S(K) - Kb provided that 0 ~ b ~ 1~3). Under assumption (A.2) it
holds that
W(K) ~ S(K)S'(K)(-2C'(S(K)) t KS'(K)C"(S(K)) t 2KS'(K)]. (A.3)
We wish to establish a condition which guarantees that the right-hand side
24of inequality (A.3) is positive. Having done so we know that (A.1) ie
satisfied and hence that d(rNtM')IdK is globally negative. Positivity of
the right-hand side of (A.3) is equivalent to requiring
C'(S(K))IKS'(K) ~ 1 t C"(S(K))l2. (A.4)
Recall that we consider the case of an adjustment cost functíon having
C'(K) ~ 0. Unfortunately, condition (A.4) does not seem to have a
straightf~~rward economic~ interpretation. However, with a concave cost
function C defined by C(S(K)) - S(K)d such that 0 ~ d ~ 1, and with S(K)
a Kb (as above), inequality (A.4) becomes
S(K)2-d ~ (2d t bd(1-d)jl2b (A.4')
Notice that (A.4') holds for almost all S(K) ~ 0 if the parameter "d" is
sufficiently small, that is, if the cost function C does not grow "too
fast".
To summarize, we have demonstrated that if (i) there is no discounting
and (ii) functions S(K) and C(S(K)) do not grow "too fast" (i.e., (A.2) and
(A.4) holds) then global negativity of d(rNtM')IdK should be guaranteed.
It remains to show that function rN(K) t M'(K) has a positive value at
K- 0. As above, suppose that r z 0 and recall that
rN(K) t M'(K) ~ S'(K) - s[g(K) t Kg'(K)] -
S'(K) - a{S(K)fC-1(S(K)) t KS'(K)IC-1(S(K)) -
KS'(K)S(K)IC'(S(K))[C-1(S(K))]2}.
(A.5)
25Notice that S'(0) ~ 0, C'(0) ~ 0. By, L'HOpital's rule the first term in
the curly bcackets in (A.5) has the limit C'(0) for K~ 0. The same holds
true for the second term. To evaluate the third term, apply L'HOpital's
rule twice. This yields a limit of the third term being equal to - C'(0).
Collecting results we obtain
lim [S'(K) - e(g(K)tKg'(K))] 3 S'(0) - aC'(0) (A.6)
K0
which is positive for S'(0) ~ aC'(0). Recalling that the total cost
function C(I) equals I f A(I)) we see that S'(0) ~ aC'(0) is equivalent to
S'(0) ~ a(1 f A'(0)). [A similar condition appears in van Schijndel (1988,
Eq. (2.31))]. The condition S'(0) ~ aC'(0) simply states that the marginal
profit derived from the first unit of capital stock must be positive.
Remark
It is easy to show that for r ~ 0, condition (A.6) is replaced by S'(0) -
(atr)C'(0). Positivity of this expression means that the marginal profit
derived from the first unit of capital stock must exceed what could have
been earned by paying the amount C'(0) out as dividend (when the
shareholders' time preference rate equals r). If S'(0) were less than
(atr)C'(0), investment in capital goods would be inferior to paying out
dividends.
The next thing we need to do is to prove Lemma 1. At t a t2 we have a
singular investment policy which satisfies (see also (9))
26P- C'(I1) s~ p~ P ' C'(I1) a C(I1)II1 (at t~ t) (A.7) 2
Due to (8), (17), (A.7) and I ~ 0 at t- t2 we obtain
P ` (rfa)p - S'(K) ~ 0 (A.8)
If we consider the optimal investment policy with I1 5 C-1(S(K)) (cf. Case
1 at the beginning of Section 3) we conclude from (A.7) and (A.e) that
I- I(P) z I1 for t2 - E ~ t 5 t2
I- 0 for t2 ~ t ~ t f e
which completes the proof of Lemma 1.
(A.9)
Finally we prove Lemma 2. Let C(I) be a convex (total) cost function
and define a linear-convex cost function, C(I), by
C(I) ~ pI for I ~ I1 ; C(I) - C(I) for I~ I1. (A.10)
The singular investment policy of the problem with cost given by (A.10) is
easily found to satisfy
C"(I) I - (rfa)C'(I) - S'(K). (A.11)
If C(I) a C(I) from (A.10) is substituted into (A.11) we obtain (17) and
conclude that the singular investment rate of the linear-convex problem
equals the singular investment rate of the convex problem for I ~ I1. When
investment I reaches the level I- I1 it must hold that
S'(K) - (rta)C'(I1) - (rfa)p, (A.12)
cf. (9), (A.10) and (A.11). Below the level I- I1 we are faced with a
linear problem which is easily solved (cf. Feichtinger and Hartl (1986, Th.
3.2)) and admits a singular solution defined by
27S'(K) ~ (rta)p. (A.13)
From (A.12) and (A.13) we see that investment I reaches the level I- I1
for K ~ K.
The phase diagram of the linear-convex problem looks very much the same
as the one depicted in Figure 5(with C replaced by C and the chattering
control replaced by a policy of replacement investment). Having
characterized the solution of the linear-convex problem allows us to state
the foliowing results for the concave-convex problem.
(a) For I ~I1 the optimal solution of the concave-convex problem is the
same as the one of the linear-convex problem.
(b) For I ~ I1 it is optimal (in the concave-convex problem) to use a
chattering control which consists of switching as fast as possible between
0 and I1, in order to keep K as close as possible to the singular level K.
In this way the payoff functional of the concave-convex problem can be made
arbitrarily close to its upper bound being the optimal value of the payoff
functional of the linear-convex problem. This can be seen by comparing the
(total) cost function of the concave-convex problem with that of the
linear-convex problem).
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